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CONTEXT
In Q3 2009-10, the average speed of broadband connections sold 
worldwide fell for the first time ever (PointTopic)
– increasing uptake of mobile connections (data sticks, Kindle, 
iPhone, iPad, etc.)
– increasing maturity of Western World fixed broadband market – the 
marginal adopter is a laggard (diffusion exceeds 50% of 
addressable market)
The proportion of disposable household income spent 
communications and information goods and services has altered 
little over the past 30 years (Galbi)
– higher fixed broadband spend must come from some other area 
(e.g. mobile broadband? TV content? newspapers? books and e-
books? music?) 
UNDERPINNING ASSUMPTIONS
‘FibreCo’ 
– ‘open access’, ‘dark fibre’ 100Mbps symmetrical
– ‘nationwide’
– regional monopolies
• regionally-specific cost structures (high vs low densities)
• regionally-specific differential prices?????
– structural separation, ownership limitations across layers
• Layer 1 - ‘dark fibre’ connections, non-discriminatory pricing
• Layer 2 - differentiated wholesale products
• Layer 3 - retail relationship
– electricity analogy 
• Layer 1 = electricity lines companies
• Layer 2 = ???????
• Layer 3 = electricity retailers
COMPETITION IMPLICATIONS
Not being implemented in a competitive vacuum
– over 60% of addressable household (90% business) internet 
market already has broadband connections
• FibreCo customers must substitute from existing technologies
• likely long in advance of the development of applications necessitating 
additional capacities of fibre (at least at 100Mbps symmetrical at level 
of every household/business)
– potential to expand existing network capacity not yet 
exhausted
• Telecom – FTTN will deliver 10Mbps nationwide by 2012; VDSL 
technologies can deliver in excess of 100Mbps symmetrical from the 
cabinet
• TelstraClear –DOCSIS 3.0-enhanced cable can deliver in excess of 
200Mbps (both up- and down-stream)
• Vodafone – mobile speeds increasing monthly
• satellite
• power lines???
THE COMPETITIVE REALITY
Except in Japan and Korea, 100Mbps symmetrical is 
the exception rather than the rule for retail FTTH 
connections (Data from OECD, 2009) 
– Dansk Bredband (Denmark) (kbps)
• 512/512; 2000/2000; 10,000/10,000; 20,000/20,000; 25,000/25,000; 
50,000/50,000; 100,000/100,000
– Elisa (Finland) 
• 1000/1000; 2000/2000; 5000/5000; 10,000/10,000; 50,000/50,000; 
100,000/100,000
– KPN (Netherlands)
• 30,000/3000; 50,000/5000; 60,000/6000
– Verizon (USA)
• 10,000/2000; 20,000/5000; 20,000/20,000; 50,000/20,000
THE COMPETITIVE REALITY
The key to successfully selling FTTH connections in a competitive 
market is to make FTTH look as much like ADSL and cable as 
possible!!!
– almost all Layer 2 investment is duplicating existing functionality 
available on copper, cable and other infrastructures
Why? Consumers are smart!
– why pay more for functionality already available/perfectly 
acceptable for existing applications on existing infrastructures?
The key to selling any infrastructure with high fixed costs is 
effective price discrimination (e.g. Ramsey Prices)
– selling the same thing to different customers at different prices
– or separating customers’ willingness to pay by some other 
dimension (e.g. network speed)
– which is exactly what (unregulated) competitors (i.e. mobile) do
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE MARKET
When offered a range of (flat-rate) plans 
– e.g. different speeds under flat-rate tariffs
price-sensitive customers will stay on congested, low-
speed and low-cost plans, whilst less sensitive ones 
will substitute to more expensive plans
– even if applications used do not necessitate its capacities
Plan speed variety becomes a proxy for customer 
segmentation by willingness to pay
– not necessarily a signal that faster speeds are necessary 
• under flat-rate plans, must offer a tangible ‘benefit’ from a different 
service to induce consumer to pay more
• more (and higher) speeds = finer discrimination
THE ECONOMICS OF FIBRECO
Rapid cost recovery relies upon signing up as many 
customers as fast as possible
– but what to do about existing purchasing relationships?
Australia
– NBNCo will not compete with Telstra 
• purchase will enable managed migration of customers from ADSL to 
fibre
– but what about the 20% of broadband customers buying 
cable?
New Zealand
– no clarity yet whether Telecom will be a competitor or 
component
– TCL cable has 7% of broadband market
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND FIBRECO 
ECONOMICS
Price discrimination matters at more than just the retail level
Price discrimination is a classic means of underpinning the case to 
invest early (i.e. when demand falls below the cost curve) in 
natural monopoly network infrastructures (very high fixed and 
sunk costs and negligible marginal costs)
– price discrimination increases welfare
– FTTH fixed cost allocations:
• Layer 1 70%
• Layer 2 20% to 25%
• Layer 3 5% - 10%
The majority of the welfare gain available from price discrimination 
for the fibre network lies at Layer 1
– yet Layer 1 is the layer where price discrimination is absolutely 
forbidden under the NZ arrangements
1. High fixed (sunk) costs means 
average cost declines as quantity 
produced increases (S)
2. Demand (D) falls below Average 
Cost (S)
3. No single price at which supply 
meets demand – the good will not 
be produced (welfare generated = 0) 
or delayed until demand grows
4. But with price discrimination Q2 
units delivered at average cost per 
unit P3 (economies of scale) 
- Q1 sold at price P1 (surplus  A) 
- Q2-Q1 sold at price P2 (loss is B)
- as long as B > A, production is 
both profitable AND welfare-
enhancing compared to the single 
price counterfactual
5. Enables NM good to be 
sustainably produced (i.e. without 
subsidy) earlier (i.e before demand 
matures) than under single price
WELFARE-ENHANCING PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION IN NATURAL 
MONOPOLY
EVEN MORE ECONOMICS OF FIBRECO
Under structural separation of Layer 1 and Layer 2, in 
the absence of price discrimination, subsidies must 
be even greater to induce layer 1 construction
Layer 2 providers can practice price discrimination (by 
offering different speeds) but separate ownership 
means surpluses generated will not be used to offset 
L1 costs (connections sold at ‘single rate’)
• rather, surpluses generated can be extracted as ‘free profits’ 
by Level 2 operators
Not a problem for NBNCo in Australia
• controls both Layer 1 and Layer 2 
• better management of subsidies between layers
IN SUMMARY
Single price for Layer 1 infrastructure means subsidy 
must be higher to induce its construction ahead of 
genuine demand for the faster service emerging than 
if price discrimination is allowed.  
Alternatively, retail prices (Layer 3) will be higher under 
non-discrimination at Layer 1 than under welfare-
maximising price discrimination by an integrated layer 
1 and 2 provider 
BEGS THE QUESTIONS
When is the right time to invest in FTTH?
– are we investing too soon/for the wrong reasons in NZ?
– should government be funding the duplication of services 
already feasible (and/or offered) on existing private-sector 
investments?
Should we be revisiting the assumptions of a 
structurally separate ‘dark fibre’, ‘open access’ Layer 
1 infrastructure sold at ‘non-discriminatory’ prices 
– imposing all of the competition-based costs of a natural 
monopoly infrastructure whilst denying the monopolist the 
opportunity of engaging in the one truly welfare-enhancing 
activities afforded to natural monopolists?
